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COHEN AND HILLER- TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE

TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE:
A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK
By: RONNIE COHEN* AND JANINE S. HILLER**

ABSTRACT
This article discusses whether the existing legal framework for property and places
should apply to the electronic medium, or whether the uniqueness of the Internet requires a
different characterization. The source of the right of the owner of an Internet site to legally
control access to and use of the site and its content is the tort law of trespass and the law of
contract. The sources of the right of users to freely access and use Internet content are the
policies of free speech and public accommodation. Part I of this paper reviews the common
law trespass theories that courts have employed to regulate online activities. Part II considers
the definition of “place”1 and whether particular uses of the Internet are “places of public
accommodation.”2 Part III proposes a new legal framework that could serve as a basis for
legislative action to promote both of these policies in cyberspace. This framework recognizes
the unique qualities of the Internet, incorporating both the public policy favoring freedom
of expression and the private property interest in controlling unauthorized use of Internet
resources.
I. INTRODUCTION
{1} Does the Internet contain a public commons in which speech and civil rights should be
protected? Conversely, do networks consist of private property that the individual owner can
control? When faced with these questions of Internet control, courts may stretch traditional
legal concepts, statutory interpretations, and the application of legal precedent to issues
involving similar, but ultimately different, questions of rights and obligations. Conflict arises
over whether the existing legal framework for property and places should apply to the electronic
medium, or whether the uniqueness of the Internet requires a different characterization. On
the one hand, the Supreme Court characterized the Internet as the “most participatory form of
mass speech yet developed,”3 while on the other hand, private networks are staking out their
claims to cyber territory and suing those who interfere with their property rights.4 The tension
between two conceptual frameworks, voice and place, is evident in the early development
of Internet case law. As courts grapple with new cases, many have analogized cyberspace to
physical places.5 The analogy is important, as it is well documented that the words we choose
to describe a concept can influence the way in which the concept is understood.6 The use
of a connected set of metaphors creates a cognitive model that unconsciously shapes our
perception of the subject.7 Metaphors give us insight to our present and future experiences,
thereby contributing to the creation of our social realities.8 The language we often use to
describe the Internet is descriptive of physical places. For example, the Internet is frequently
referred to as the “Information Superhighway.”9 Searching for information is often referred to
as “surfing.”10 The NetLingo dictionary offers many other terms as examples of the language of
place, including address, architecture, chat room, crawler, data traffic, domain name, firewall,
gateway, local area and wide area networks, navigate, netizen, and portal.11 We use these
terms to describe both the concept of the Internet and the activities we associate with it. The
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terms also play a part in setting the legal landscape of Internet law.12 If we analogize various
aspects of the Internet, such as networks and web sites, to physical places, which are generally
governed by property law, then we will likely determine the relationships of people who occupy,
visit, or intrude upon those places by reference to traditional property law.13
{2}The consistent application of a framework of either private or public property, place or
possession, to the use of computer networks will resound in many ways that may not be within
the current contemplation of the courts.14 Is there an alternative conceptualization of the Internet,
one that overcomes the limitations of metaphor? Should this concept include the Internet as
a voice, as well as a place? Is the law of speech and public forum an important element of the
framework?15
{3}The right of the owner of an Internet site to legally control access to and use of the site and its
content is based on the tort law of trespass and the law of contract. The right of users to freely
access and use Internet content is based on policies of free speech and public accommodation.
Part I of this paper reviews the common law trespass theories that litigants have argued, and
courts have employed, to regulate online activities. Part II considers the definition of “place” and
whether particular uses of the Internet are “places of public accommodation.” Part III proposes
a new legal framework that could serve as a basis for legislative action to promote both of
these policies in cyberspace. This framework recognizes the unique qualities of the Internet,
incorporating both the public policy favoring freedom of expression and the private property
interest in controlling unauthorized use of Internet resources.
II. TRESPASS
{4} Both trespass to personal property and trespass to real property are relevant to the discussion
of Internet property. The Restatement of Torts is a leading treatise in the development of civil
law. It is influential in state law development and serves as persuasive authority for judicial
decisions.16 Section 217 of the Second Restatement of Torts defines a trespass to chattels, or
personal property, as the following: “A trespass to a chattel may be committed by intentionally (a)
dispossessing another of the chattel, or (b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession
of another.”17 Section 218 states additional requirements for damages to the property in order for
a person to be liable for the trespass:
One who commits a trespass to a chattel is subject to liability to the possessor
of the chattel if, but only if, (a) he dispossesses the other of the chattel, or (b)
the chattel is impaired as to its condition, quality, or value, or (c) the possessor is
deprived of the use of the chattel for a substantial time, or (d) bodily harm is caused
to the possessor, or harm is caused to some person or thing in which the possessor
has a legally protected interest.18
{5} The comments to Section 218 explain that damages for trespass to chattels do not arise
automatically, as with real property, but instead require that an important interest of the
possessor of the chattel be affected.19 In addition, the comments explain that:
[O]ne who intentionally intermeddles with another’s chattel is subject to liability only if his
intermeddling is harmful to the possessor’s materially valuable interest in the physical
condition, quality, or value of the chattel, or if the possessor is deprived of the use of the
chattel for a substantial time, or some other legally protected interest of the possessor is
affected.20
Thus, there are two basic requirements to prove trespass to chattels. First, the chattel must be
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interfered with, or meddled with, and second, the chattel must suffer some damage.
{6} Illustration 2 of the Restatement is important in the context of trespass to chattels in the
Internet environment. It explains; “A, a child, climbs upon the back of B’s large dog and pulls its
ears. No harm is done to the dog or to any other legally protected interest of B. A is not liable to
B.”21 As the example highlights, proof of damages should be an important element in a case of
trespass to chattels in the Internet environment.
{7} In comparison to the tort of trespass to chattels, which requires proof of damages, the tort
of trespass to land requires only that there be a proof of a physical incursion onto the property
of another.22 It is the protection of the landowner’s right to exclude all others, which is reflected
in the tort of trespass to land.23 Thus, no actual damages need be proven in order to prove
liability for trespass; nominal damages will be awarded.24 To a great extent this is a result of the
historical background of real property law, from English common law, that real property rights are
inviolate.25
{8} The right to exclude others is also seen as a part of a real property owner’s “bundle of
property rights.”26 Although historically real property rights have been seen as sacrosanct, the
Supreme Court has noted that “[n]either property rights nor contract rights are absolute . . .
. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest . . . .”27 As Internet sites define their terms of use, and create contracts to delineate
authorized access, Internet site administrators may exclude potential users and limit use of the
website.28 The state, however, may be within its rights to regulate the privately imposed terms of
use to protect the public interest in an open Internet. In modern law, the nature of the property
affects real property rights. That is, if private property is used as a public place, civil rights laws
as well as the laws of common carriers place limitations on the owner’s right to exclude others.29
{9} The state may also act to protect public speech on private property. While some state
constitutions provide protection for free speech on certain types of private property,30 most do
not,31 and no equivalent federal protection exists.32 Moreover, while it is possible that the state’s
enforcement of trespass laws might constitute the state action necessary to bring a speech claim
in these cases, no such state action is present where a private entity engages in discriminatory
enforcement of private terms of use.33
{10} The controlling case recognizing the right of a state to protect speech on private property
is Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins.34 In Pruneyard, the United States Supreme Court held
that California’s constitutional guarantee of the right to speech and petition was enforceable
against the owner of a private shopping center, and that it did not amount to a taking of property
to require the property owner to allow the speech on its private property.35 Although the United
States Constitution does not guarantee such a right, a state may do so, as long as it does not so
interfere with the use of the property that it amounts to a “taking” under the Fifth Amendment.36
{11} The most recent case to apply the Pruneyard rationale to state action is Albertson’s Inc.
v. Young,37 where the California Court discussed whether the right to free speech was protected
on the sidewalk of a grocery store. The court stated that “[t]he test that courts must apply is
whether, considering the nature and circumstances of the private property, it has become the
functional equivalent of a traditional public forum.”38 The court then carefully examined the
physical location of the store, the layout, its size, parking lots, and relation of the speech to the
business.39 Because the store was a one-story building, not connected to other contiguous stores,
with relatively site-specific parking, and no areas designed for public congregation, it was not a
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1

COHEN AND HILLER- TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE
public forum.40 In addition, the speech did not relate to criticism of the business itself, therefore
not implicating free speech under that more specific scenario.41
A. Electronic Robots and Trespass to Chattels
{12} Several trespass to chattel cases address the issue of Internet access to another’s computer
through its website. One of the first cases to consider the application of the trespass to chattels
tort to the Internet was TicketMaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc.42 A computer program, known
as a web crawler, searched the Ticketmaster web site and transferred that information to the
Tickets.com format on the Tickets.com web site.43 The court found that while the trespass to
chattels claim could apply to such a circumstance, because the information was publicly available
and there was no proof of irreparable injury, the action failed.44 To date this is the only case that
has denied an injunction for trespass to chattels when an electronic agent has obtained web site
information.
{13} Most courts have found that even minimal harm can support a trespass to chattels claim
and have more broadly applied this common law tort to the new medium.45 In eBay v. Bidder’s
Edge,46 Register.com v. Verio,47 and Oyster Software v. Forms Processing,48 the courts addressed
whether the use of an electronic robot to search a plaintiff’s website constitutes a trespass. In
Intel v. Hamidi,49 the court considered whether the sending of an e-mail through a proprietary
company e-mail network constitutes trespass to chattels. In all of these cases, the court
examines the intangible attributes of the electronic environment in order to apply the age-old
tort of trespass to chattels, where the computer system was the personal property subject to the
trespass. These three recent trespass cases involving commercial robots searching the computers
of another are important background to the Hamidi case that involves expressive action, but
which, nonetheless, is pursued under the rubric of an invasion of a common law right in property.
{14} An electronic robot is a program that will scour web sites automatically for particular
information.50 Robots can also be known as “scrapers,” as they scrape information off of web
sites, or as “spyders,” as they spin a web to catch information.51 In each of the three cases,
eBay v. Bidder’s Edge, Register.com v. Verio, and Oyster Software v. Forms Processing, the
defendant used an electronic robot to secure some type of information from the plaintiff’s web
site. Bidder’s Edge and Verio obtained significant amounts of information from the plaintiff’s site
in this manner. Bidder’s Edge robots scanned the prices listed on eBay approximately 100,000
times a day.52 Verio accessed the WHOIS database of Register.com daily to obtain registered
domain names and to match them with contact information.53 Although these websites are
open to the public, and no information obtained by the robots is in any way confidential, in each
case the terms of use prohibits the use of electronic access by robots. Thus, in both cases the
unauthorized access by these robots to automatically collect publicly available information,
coupled with the use of the plaintiffs’ system capacity, resulted in the issuance of a preliminary
injunction by the courts based on trespass to chattels. The unauthorized access, viewed in light
of the terms of use, satisfied the meddling component of trespass, and the reduced network
capacity satisfied the damage component.54
{15} Oyster Software involved a different level of interference with chattels. An automated
program extracted information contained in the web page metatags, which are simple codes that
list identifying words that are like an index to finding the web site.55 Without discussion, the court
made note that the access to the computer to copy the metatags was without authorization.56
The court found that significant damages are not required to prove trespass to chattels when a
computer is the property involved; all that is needed is use of another’s computer.57 Therefore, the
mere copying of the plaintiff’s metatags by Oyster’s electronic robot was a sufficient allegation to
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defeat the motion to dismiss the trespass to chattels claim.58 It has been suggested that when
courts allow minimal damages to suffice, as was the situation in the Oyster case, they confuse
the analysis of trespass to chattels with trespass to real property.59
B. Unwanted Messages and Trespass to Chattels
{16} Unsolicited bulk e-mail, also known as spam, is a problem for system administrators and
individuals because it uses server space and interferes with normal communications. Early cases
established a fairly consistent view that spam could be actionable as a trespass to chattels. The
first case was CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.60 Because of customer complaints,
CompuServe notified Cyber Promotions to cease sending e-mails to its subscribers; however,
Cyber Promotions refused to do so. The court applied the law of trespass to chattels as found
in the Restatement and identified the harm to CompuServe’s computer service caused by the
large amount of unsolicited e-mail as the core of the tort.61 Following the Compuserve case,
several cases brought by America Online (AOL) confirmed the application of the tort of trespass
to chattels as a basis for injunctions to prevent spam and awarded damages to the plaintiff.
According to the court in these cases, the sending of bulk e-mail, the spam, violated the site’s
stated terms of use. The number of e-mails sent was significant to the computer network in these
cases: in AOL v. IMS,62 60 million e-mails were sent, in AOL v. LCGM, Inc.,63 over 90 million e-mail
messages sent, and in AOL v. Greatdeals.net,64 over 130 million e-mails were sent. In all of these
cases, AOL was successful in arguing that the spam constituted a trespass to its system, and that
it had been harmed by the effect on the system of the large amounts of unsolicited e-mail.
{17} In contrast to commercial messages, Intel Corp. v. Hamidi65 involved the use of a company’s
e-mail system without the system’s permission in order to convey messages criticizing the
company. The decision addressed the clash between speech and property rights. Hamidi was the
webmaster for a forum devoted to airing grievances about the work environment and conditions
at Intel Corporation. The forum was not hosted on Intel’s network. In addition, he sent several emails to all of Intel’s employees and took steps to defeat Intel’s security that blocked messages
from certain outside sources. Hamidi argued that this electronic forum was essential for
communication between employees of Intel’s international corporation, who otherwise would be
unable to effectively communicate across the globe.66
{18} Intel, however, did not appreciate Hamidi’s e-mails to its employees, and Intel claimed a
trespass to its chattel. The action was based on the argument that Hamidi committed a trespass
to the internal e-mail system of Intel, because he sent six e-mails to thousands of electronic
work addresses of Intel employees. Intel claimed the e-mails clogged its system and wasted
company human capital, because the company had to use additional resources to stop Hamidi’s
messages.67 The additional resources were necessary, in part, because Hamidi took steps to
defeat Intel’s security, forcing the company to bolster that security by blocking and removing the
messages.68
{19} The California appellate court began its discussion of the nature of trespass to chattels and
the Internet by noting “[t]he common law adapts to human endeavor.”69 The court recognized
the additional challenge of applying the law to the electronic world of communication in that
“[t]respass to chattels is somewhat arcane and suffers from desuetude.”70 Not dissuaded, the
court then proceeded to chart the development of the common law of trespass to chattels and
its historical precedents.71 It noted the progression of cases from early in the common law, and
arrived at the conclusion that trespass to chattels could occur with electronic messages, as they
are close enough to tangible personal property to fall into the chattel category.72 In addition, the
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1

COHEN AND HILLER- TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE
damage to the chattel was found in the time that the system administrators of Intel took to block
the messages, and the time of each employee who opened, read and disposed of the individual
message found in their e-mail. Thus, the court upheld an injunction ordering Hamidi to cease
sending e-mails to Intel employees’ business addresses.73
{20} In June 2003, the Supreme Court of California reversed judgment of the appellate court,
distinguishing both the facts and the law from the earlier decision.74 Noting most of the facts
cited by the summary judgment, the sending of critical emails to Intel employees by Hamidi
and the subsequent blocking and cease and desist notices by Intel, the court reached different
conclusions about these actions.75 Whereas in the earlier decision the court described Hamidi’s
actions as a breach of Intel’s security system, the Supreme Court of California noted that no
evidence supported this allegation.76 Instead, internal Intel e-mails referred to the fact that no
security was breached, and Hamidi stated that he obtained the e-mail list from a computer disc
that was sent to him anonymously.77
{21} Next, the Supreme Court discussed and adopted the Restatement definition of trespass to
torts as the law of California. 78 The court noted the position of Prosser & Keeton and found that
while there has been some disagreement, there must be actual damage to the personal property,
not merely nominal damages.79 The court stated that “[t]he dispositive issue in this case,
therefore, is whether the undisputed facts demonstrate Hamidi’s actions caused or threatened
to cause damage to Intel’s computer system, or injury to its rights in that personal property, such
as to entitle Intel to judgment as a matter of law.”80 Reviewing past cases, the court found that
in order to constitute damage to a computer system there must be an “actual or threatened
interference with the computers’ functioning.”81 The court considered the application of the
tort of trespass to chattels in cases of automated search engines and spam and found that the
damages required an impairment of the system, as with the sending of millions of spam e-mails
and automated searches, or the threatened impairment of the system.82
{22} Significantly, the court carefully described and distinguished the case from eBay v. Bidders
Edge.83 To the extent that the eBay court based its decision on the threatened harm that many
automated searches could inflict upon the computer system if allowed access without limit, the
court agreed with the finding that trespass occurred because of the threatened impairment.84
The court expressly disagreed with any application of the principle that harm could result from
minor intrusions, and declined to accept the eBay decision taken out of that specific context.85
Furthermore, the court noted its skepticism about accepting the CompuServe line of cases that
categorized the loss of goodwill and more generalized economic injury as sufficient for trespass
to chattels.86 Even if it were to accept this approach, however, the Intel injury would still be
too attenuated to suffice as a recognizable harm. CompuServe lost customers as a result of
the impact that spam had on the functioning of the system, while Intel’s loss was only for the
“distraction” that the e-mails caused to its employees, unrelated to the system function.87 Finally,
the court specifically rejected the Oyster Software decision as an incorrect statement of California
law to the extent that it held that the mere access to another’s website in order to copy metatags
was a trespass, without proof of actual damages.88
{23} Thus, the California Supreme Court returns the tort of trespass to chattels to its common
law roots. In order to succeed, a trespass to chattels allegation involving computer systems must
include actual or threatened damage. This decision squarely puts the computer system into the
realm of personal property rather than real property, although arguments that the real property
analogy should apply were raised by amici.
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C. Electronic Speech and Real Property
{24} The rights of free speech often conflict with the rights of the landowner to control access
to and use of the property.89 The appellate court in Hamidi was one of the first courts to address
this issue as it applies to the Internet, and it favored property rights over rights of speech, at least
within the facts presented.90 However, the dissent in the appellate Hamidi case focused on the
fact that the damage alleged was too far removed from the property to constitute a trespass.91
The dissent argued that employee time is not closely connected to the system itself,92 unlike
previous electronic trespass cases, where the damage caused by robots, for example, was
identified as the use of and limitation to the electronic system.93 Indeed, in Hamidi, Intel claimed
no damage from the e-mails clogging their system, and under the facts it is questionable that
they could have succeeded in that argument.94
{25} The dissent warned that extending the tort of trespass to chattels to situations where
the harm consists of merely having to read unwanted e-mails could result in quite significant
unintended consequences,95 and that it, “transforms a tort meant to protect possessory
interests into one that merely attacks speech.”96 One commentator criticized the majority’s
characterization of the e-mails as a physical trespass on private property and suggested that
Hamidi’s conduct was instead like that of a person shouting at Intel’s employees from a public
park outside Intel’s offices “and Intel wants the court to force Hamidi to take his megaphone and
his message elsewhere.”97 Indeed, it is likely that Intel’s primary objection was to the message,
not to the minimal burden of closing the office windows to reduce the noise.
{26} The California Supreme Court in Hamidi agreed with the dissent in the lower court,
specifically reviewing, but rejecting, arguments that the law applied to computer systems should
mirror the inviolability of real property so that the owner would have complete control over the
use of that system. 98 Amici curiae briefs were filed on both sides of the case. On one side,
amici argued in support of the real property analogy, pointing out that the metaphors used for
the Internet are real property ones such as those discussed earlier: “information superhighway,”
“cyberspace,” and “addresses.”99 The court was not persuaded that metaphors should have an
effect on law and noted that other metaphors lent themselves to concepts of personal property,
such as the “Net,” which could be analogized to a fisherman’s net.100 The court noted that “such
fictions promise more confusion than clarity in the law.”101 The second argument, that it would
be economically beneficial and socially desirable to treat computer systems as real property, was
also rejected by the court.102
{27} Amici also argued that companies that are given the right to complete control over their
computer systems will continue to allow linking and connecting to the Internet, and that in a
specific case of access denial, individual licensing will most efficiently resolve the dispute.103
However, other amici argued that the benefit of the Internet itself is that it is an open network.
Individual restrictions on the operation and use of the open network could impose significant
transaction costs and decrease its intrinsic value.104 Despite this dilemma, the court declined to
offer a solution, maintaining instead that legislatures had already separately begun to address
the problems of spam and that a blanket ruling analogizing computer systems to real property
would be premature.105
{28} A related issue is whether the real property analogy should qualify the system as a
public forum. Although a recent case held that an internet chat room is not a place of public
accommodation, no case to date has presented the general question of whether a private web
site can operate as a public forum.106 This could be the basis of future action if the court applies
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the physical place analogy. If a court uses the Albertson case as a guide, it may well classify a
private web site as a public forum.107 A business web site that is open to the public cannot exist
as a “stand alone” store.108 Only through its existence within the Internet and interconnectedness
with all other web sites does it operate. The interconnected web of the Internet is its essence and
its commercial value. In addition, the history of the Internet as a government sponsored medium
– where the government still maintains an active but indirect role in its management – provides
an argument for its categorization as a public forum.109 The Supreme Court has noted that the
Internet is truly a medium for communication.110 Yet how does an internal company network,
limited to employee use and utilizing the public network known as the Internet, relate to public
communication?111
{29} The next section considers another cyberspace context in which the concepts of property
and place are intertwined with speech. Do the laws preventing discrimination in places of public
accommodation apply to Internet chat rooms? Should the anti-discrimination laws applicable to
private property govern a virtual forum for communication?
III. PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION AND COMMON CARRIAGE
{30} The law applied to public accommodations is found in the common law, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Like trespass, the law regarding public
accommodation has a long history in the common law. This history was recounted in a U.S.
Supreme Court case challenging the conviction for trespass of twelve African American students
after a sit-in at a Maryland restaurant in 1963.112 The court stated that “the good old common
law” required that the state insure all citizens’ access to places of public accommodations.113
This is the basis of an innkeeper’s duty “to take in all travelers and wayfaring persons,” then
extended to common carriers, and later to public shows and amusements.114
A. Civil Rights Act
{31} Access to public accommodation is also guaranteed under federal civil rights laws. The
common law duty to provide access to public accommodations is the basis of Title II of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. The Act provides: “All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or segregation on the ground of
race, color, religion or national origin.”115
{32} Since its enactment in 1964, the Civil Rights Act and its state counterparts have been
interpreted many times as the struggle to end discrimination extended to forums beyond essential
services, such as education, transportation, and lodging.116 Among the many defenses raised
by groups and institutions seeking to avoid the mandate of equal treatment, a number of cases
revolved around the question of whether the site of the discrimination was a “place” at all.
Defendants who are membership organizations have argued that they are “private clubs” and thus
exempt from the Act.117 Alternatively, if membership is non-exclusive, organizations have argued
that their activities are not tied to a particular place and therefore the organization does not come
within the definition of “place of public accommodation.”118
{33} In Welsh v. Boy Scouts of America,119 Mark Welsh, a seven year-old boy who was denied
admission to the Boy Scouts because of his refusal to take an oath affirming his belief in God,
argued that that his exclusion from the organization was illegal discrimination based on his
religious belief. The Boy Scouts of America asserted that the organization was a membership
organization and therefore not subject to the Act. First, the court asked “whether Congress
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intended to govern organizations like the Boy Scouts within the statutory language ‘place of
public accommodation’ or ‘other place of . . . entertainment?’”120 The court noted that although
the statute lists fifteen examples of regulated facilities, none of them “remotely resembles a
membership organization.”121 The court then considered whether the Boy Scouts of America
was included as a place of exhibition or entertainment. And again, the court concluded that
the language of the statute does not include a “membership organization whose purpose is not
closely connected to a particular facility.”122
{34} Title II of the Civil Rights Act does not include a prohibition against gender discrimination in
places of public accommodation. Thus, when the National Organization for Women successfully
challenged the Little League’s exclusion of girls from its activities, it did so under the New
Jersey state civil rights statute.123 The New Jersey law is broader than the federal law, because it
extends to gender discrimination, but the public accommodation language is similar to Title II. In
interpreting that language, the New Jersey court stated:
The statutory noun “place” (of public accommodation) is a term of convenience,
not of limitation. It is employed to reflect the fact that public accommodations are
commonly provided at “fixed places,” e.g., hotels, restaurants, swimming pools, etc.
But a public conveyance, like a train, is a “place” of public accommodation although
it has a moving situs….124
{35} Likewise, the court dismissed the defense that Little League is a membership organization
similar to a private club. The court approved of the lower court’s conclusion that “membership
organizations, although not having a ‘specific pinpointable geographic area,’ are nevertheless
places of public accommodation if, as Little League does, they offer advantages and facilities on
the basis of a general, public invitation to join.”125
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
{36} The Americans with Disabilities Act requires that access to public accommodation be
available to persons with disabilities, providing that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person
who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.”126
{37} A recent, much debated case interpreting this language in the Americans with Disabilities
Act is PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin.127 Casey Martin, a well-known and talented professional golfer,
has a circulatory disorder that prevents him from walking golf courses.128 The use of a golf cart
violated one of the rules of the Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA), which sponsors major
golf tournaments for which Martin qualified in all other respects.129 Martin sued, alleging that
the PGA was a place of public accommodation, and as such, was required to make reasonable
accommodation to individuals with disabilities.130 The court examined whether the PGA is a place
of public accommodation, under Title III of the Americans With Disabilities Act, and if so, whether
the use of the golf cart fundamentally alters the nature of the event?131
{38} The PGA argued that it was a private club or private establishment, or, alternatively, that “the
play areas of its tour competitions do not constitute places of public accommodation.”132 The
list of covered establishments under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act and those of
Title II of the Civil Rights Act are similar. In fact, the first three categories of the Americans with
Disabilities Act are identical to the categories of the Civil Rights Act, although the language is
slightly more modern.133
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{39} The Martin Court noted the similarity of the two statutes. The Court stated that its
conclusion that the PGA is a place of public accommodation is consistent with case law under
the Civil Rights Act, citing Daniel v. Paul,134 a 1969 civil rights case. In Daniel, the court found
that a snack bar in a recreational club made the club a place of public accommodation,135
but the Court in Martin cited Daniel as standing for the proposition that the phrase “place of
public accommodation” covers participants in a sport or athletic activity, with no reference
to the snack bar that was the basis of the Daniel court’s decision.136 In essence, the Martin
court interpreted the Civil Rights Act to apply to a much broader range of activities than those
occurring at a specific, physical place.137 The court concluded that the PGA was a place of public
accommodation, but, in fact, the Professional Golfers’ Association is an organization and not a
place at all.
{40} Can we conclude that, in using the same language as the Civil Rights Act, Congress, when
it enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act almost thirty years later, intended that the Acts
would be interpreted consistently? That appears to be what the Supreme Court believed in the
Martin case. To take the contrary position that the Americans with Disabilities Act contains a
broader description of place of public accommodation than the Civil Rights Act would mean that
Congress is more concerned about disability discrimination than it is about racial, religious and
ethnic discrimination. If the Supreme Court correctly interpreted Congress’ intent, it is certainly
likely that in the passage of time since 1964, Congress realized that more and more activities are
important to equal access to society’s benefits and opportunities.
C. The Internet and Public Accommodation
{41} Accommodation law, as described above, requires that places open to the public be nondiscriminatory. But, is the Internet a place?138 Webster’s Dictionary defines “place” as, among
other things, a “physical environment” or “an indefinite region or expanse.”139 While the first
definition describes the traditional notion of place, the second one could describe the concept of
cyberspace as a place.
{42} Cases discussed in the previous sections of this paper indicate that a number of courts have
viewed computer networks as property with physical characteristics, upon which robots may enter
and trespass.140 It has been recognized that “at early common law, trespass required a physical
touching of another’s chattel or entry onto another’s land. The modern rule recognizes an indirect
touching or entry.”141 This rule has recognized trespass from dust particles, smoke, sound waves,
and, most recently, electronic signals.142 Thus, the courts have interpreted the common law tort
of trespass over time to award damages for harm similar to a physical interference, although the
property being trespassed on and the trespasser are no longer required to have a physical form.
Using the development of this trespass model for the question of place, will the law recognize the
Internet as fitting within Webster’s definition of “an indefinite region or expanse”143 that has no
physical location as a place?
{43} This question is posed with respect to online chat rooms in a United States District Court
case in which the plaintiff claimed that America Online’s unequal treatment of hate messages
based on religion and national origin in its chat rooms amounted to discrimination in a place
of public accommodation, prohibited by Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.144 Plaintiff Noah,
a Muslim male, filed suit on behalf of himself and other Muslims who were current and former
members of American Online and were “insulted, threatened, mocked, ridiculed and slandered
by other AOL members due to their religious beliefs in AOL’s ‘Beliefs in Islam’ and ‘Koran’ chat
rooms.”145 Although AOL’s terms of service state that this type of offensive content is prohibited,
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology- Fall 2003- Volume X, Issue 1

COHEN AND HILLER- TOWARDS A THEORY OF CYBERPLACE
and that those who post such messages may have their membership terminated, Noah claimed
that AOL did not enforce these rules in the chat rooms equally, and that content offensive to
Muslim beliefs was not addressed. Furthermore, Noah claimed that AOL enforced the rules in
chat rooms dealing with other subjects and, particularly, with other faiths. As a result, Noah
argued this differential treatment was religious discrimination in violation of the contract
with AOL in its terms of use, Title II and the First Amendment.146 The court recognized that
the identified chat room communication directed to Muslims was “offensive, obnoxious, and
indecent.” 147 Regardless, AOL’s terms of service allowed, rather than required, AOL to take action,
and therefore the breach of contract claim failed. 148
{44} The Noah court rejected Noah’s Title II claims for two reasons. First, it found that section
230 of the Communications Decency Act149 granted immunity to AOL, an interactive computer
service provider.150 It found that AOL, as a service provider, cannot be treated as a publisher, and
cannot be held liable for the statements of third parties made in the chat rooms, according to
section 230. Noah’s argument that AOL was a place of public accommodation, not a publisher,
and was therefore without immunity under section 230, was unpersuasive. In considering Noah’s
request for an injunction, the court noted that it would treat AOL as a publisher under section
230.151 And, since the Civil Rights Act was not mentioned in the list of exceptions to section 230
immunity, the court found that claims such as Noah’s were subject to its provisions.152
{45} Nevertheless, the court went on to consider the Title II claim, and concluded that “AOL’s
chat rooms and other online services did not constitute a ‘place of public accommodation’ under
Title II.”153 The court rejected the reasoning that computer networks share the legal attributes
of physical places for purposes of coverage under the Civil Rights Act, stating that “[a]lthough
a chat room may serve as a virtual forum through which AOL members can meet and converse
in cyberspace, it is not an ‘establishment’ under the plain meaning of that term as defined by
the statute.”154 In reaching its conclusion, the court noted that membership organizations, such
as the Boy Scouts, were not found to be places of accommodation.155 The court also reviewed
the Americans with Disabilities Act cases involving the issue of non-physical places as public
accommodations, noting that jurisdictions are split on this question.
{46} In Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines, Co., the federal district court in Florida refused to
extend the Americans with Disabilities Act to websites.156 The plaintiff, an advocacy organization
for the disabled, claimed that Southwest Airlines violated the Americans with Disabilities Act
because its online ticket purchasing system was inaccessible to blind persons.157 The court noted
that the Eleventh Circuit had historically taken a narrow view of the Americans with Disabilities
Act with respect to the definition of place, in contrast to the more inclusive position of other
circuits. While these circuit court cases did not involve web sites, they each considered a service
that was not attached to a physical location, and therefore were considered by the court.158
{47} In Carparts Distribution Center, Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler’s Association,159 the First
Circuit held that the Americans with Disabilities Act covers health benefit plans that are not
affixed to any physical location.160 The court noted that the Americans with Disabilities Act
includes “travel service” among the list of services considered “public accommodations,” and
concluded that the Americans with Disabilities Act is not limited to physical structures.161 The
court further opined that “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter an office to
purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons who purchase the same services over
the telephone or by mail are not. Congress could not have intended such an absurd result.”162
It would certainly be consistent to include websites in the court’s characterization of alternate
means of accessing services.
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{48} In Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.,163 the question was whether the Americans with
Disabilities Act specifically included insurance polices.164 Judge Posner wrote:
[T]he Core meaning of [42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)], plainly enough, is that the owner or
operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s office, travel agency, theater, Web
site or other facility (whether in physical space or electronic space) . . . that is open
to the public cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once
in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled do.165
{49} In Access Now, the District Court for the Southern District of Florida was not persuaded by
the Doe and Carparts cases. The court stated that if it followed Doe, it would be compelled to
find in favor of the Internet being a place of public accommodation, but that to hold in this way
would conflict with the narrower view taken by the Eleventh Circuit.166 In a previous Eleventh
Circuit case, the plaintiff challenged the Who Wants to be a Millionaire television show’s method
of screening contestants over the telephone, as discriminating against the disabled.167 The court
held that if the discrimination does not actually occur at a physical place, in order to be actionable
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, there must be a nexus between the discrimination and
a physical location.168 It found such a nexus in the case, because the screening process was the
method to choose contestants who would appear at the physical site of the show.169 Applying
this narrow rationale, the district court in Access Now found that the website was not covered by
the Americans with Disabilities Act because it was not a means of accessing an actual physical
location.170 The court noted that although such a nexus might be found between the virtual ticket
counter and the aircraft, aircraft were specifically exempted from the Americans with Disabilities
Act.171 One may speculate that the circuit courts that heard the Carparts and Mutual of Omaha
cases might disagree if similar facts were presented.
{50} Relying heavily on the Access Now decision, the Noah court did not address the fact that the
harm allegedly suffered by Saad Noah was exactly the kind of harm that Congress intended to
redress in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.172 Support for taking this harm into account
is found in prior Supreme Court decisions. In finding that the Act covered a recreational area with
a snack bar in Daniel v. Paul,173 the Supreme Court stated:
Admittedly, most of the discussion in Congress regarding the coverage of Title II
focused on places of spectator entertainment rather than recreational areas. But
it does not follow that the scope . . . should be restricted to the primary objects of
Congress’ concern when a natural reading of its language would call for broader
coverage.17
{51} As the foregoing discussion suggests, a reading of the language is ambiguous with regard
to the law’s application to cyberspace. Consequently, unless Congress moves to amend the law,
it may be left to the states to address online discrimination in the online forum. Lastly, the Noah
court quickly dispensed with the First Amendment claim, because there was no state action
involved in the private actions of AOL concerning its chat rooms.175
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK
{52} In the 1999 Department of Commerce report, Falling Through the Net: Defining the Digital
Divide,176 the National Telecommunications and Information Administration observed that access
to the Internet was a prerequisite to full participation in the society of the twenty-first century.177
In this early report, participation was equated with access:
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For some individuals, it is an economic solution. Lower prices, leasing
arrangements, and even free computer deals will bridge the digital gap for them.
For high cost communities and low-income individuals, universal service policies
will remain of critical importance. For other individuals, there are language and
cultural barriers that need to be addressed. Products will need to be adapted
to meet special needs, such as those of the disabled community. Finally, we
need to redouble our outreach efforts, especially directed at the information
disadvantaged.178
{53} In its most recent report, the Department of Commerce found that Internet access
was growing rapidly,179 leading one commentator to conclude that the digital divide is not
the civil liberties issue of the twenty-first century.180 However, while access remains an
important first step, it alone will not create equality of opportunity to participate in the
electronic revolution.181 As demonstrated by the civil rights struggles of the past century,
just opening the door to the schoolhouse is not sufficient for equality of treatment. The
curriculum, the teachers, and the textbooks must not exclude anyone from meaningful
participation. Similarly, the way in which the Internet is managed and how speech is
allowed to be privately regulated will determine if certain groups are able to fully use and
enjoy their access.
{54} Entertainment, work, banking and investing, shopping, and social interaction are just some
of the functions that occurred in physical space in 1964 when the Civil Rights Act was passed to
prohibit discrimination in these spaces. All of these lifetime activities, and more, now also occur
in cyberspace. The stated purpose of the Civil Rights Act, however, is significantly undermined if
the activities in cyberspace are exempt from its coverage. While economic barriers to Internet
access appear to be diminishing, barriers based on discrimination have, heretofore, received little
attention. Noah requires the court to consider whether the legal tools exist to insure that such
barriers will not be built in cyberspace.182 The court in Access Now chose not to open the doors of
the Internet to all citizens.183 This presents a crossroads online; if access is to be guaranteed, it
must be guaranteed through legislation.
{55} Any proposed legislation must take into account the various types of Internet activity.
Participatory Internet activities, like their physical world counterparts, vary widely. For example,
people may join a listserv in order to carry on a conversation with like-minded people, people
in the same occupation, or with some other common characteristic. A listserv is analogous to
a private club, if membership is based on a legitimate credential related to the purpose of the
list. A listserv that admits members who only share a commitment to a particular purpose would
likely be an exempt membership organization under the Civil Rights Act, if the Civil Rights Act is
applied to the Internet.
{56} A chat room, on the other hand, is open to anyone who joins the network. AOL membership
is solicited through general advertisement, distribution of the software through the mail,
and automatic membership with the purchase of a new personal computer from certain
manufacturers. It is “open to the public” in every sense of the word. People meet, and have
real-time conversations in these virtual rooms, just as they would in physical rooms. The advent
of streaming audio and video capability increasingly blurs the distinction between physical and
cyber locations. Thus, the provider should not create discriminatory barriers by setting different
standards for participation based on characteristics that are prohibited by civil rights legislation.
{57} Any proposal to relieve the tension between the legal treatment of the Internet as place
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or property, or a medium of expression, should balance the interests of those who maintain the
online forum and those who seek access to it. Rather than attempting to meld the analysis of
the Internet medium into common law and existing statutes that are ill equipped to address the
technological issues, it is proposed that a new framework be adopted. A new framework will
result in a cleaner approach that does not blur the distinction between trespass to chattels and
trespass to realty, and which will recognize the incredible public interest in preserving speech in
this “most participatory form of mass speech yet developed.”184 The metaphors used to describe
the Internet, at their worst, serve to blur the nature of the medium. In truth, the Internet is a
place where people meet to communicate, where businesses meet consumers and sell their
products, and where investments in web site development and presence are electronic versions
of property. No one metaphor, or legal parallel, will reflect the myriad nature of this Internet.
Therefore, new terminology, which recognizes the complexity of the Internet relationship,
is necessary. While abandoning outdated laws and imprecise language, it is unnecessary
to abandon the principles upon which our historical legal concepts depend. The proposed
framework creates new terminology for addressing the Internet, yet incorporates the recognized
principles that public policy demands: private property, public access and free speech. Only new
terminology can bring legal clarity to apply these principles to the Internet medium.
{58} One approach to resolving the tension between the Internet as a voice and the Internet
as a place looks, in part, to the common law of public accommodation as the basis for a new
Restatement concept. The authors propose the following new Restatement provisions:
Places of Public Communication
A private provider of online content and/or access creates a place of public communication
when:
1)

the online access or content is generally available to the public; or

2)

the online access or content is available to a limited number of persons for a
commercial reason.

3)

A place of public communication does not include any content or access made
available by a person for employee- or independent contractor-only use.
Access to Places of Public Communication

1)

A place of public communication shall not discriminate based on age, disability,
gender, national origin, political views, race, or religion.

2)

Individuals who are harmed by discrimination in a place of public communication
shall have an action in tort to recover actual damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Rights Associated with Places of Public Communication

1)

Reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions on public access may be imposed
on places of public communication in order to prevent interference with normal
business operations.

2)

Persons who enter places of public communication shall have the duty to abide by
reasonable and non-discriminatory restrictions established by the provider.

3)

Failure to follow reasonable and non-discriminatory restrictions creates tort liability
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for the actual, non-trivial harm incurred by the provider of the place of public
communication.
4)

These rights replace the rights of the provider of the place of public communication
to pursue actions in trespass.

{59} Thus, a place of public communication seeks to extend the common law duty of nondiscrimination imposed on innkeepers and common carriers to online service providers. The
provision seeks to protect the private property of the provider, while at the same time it
recognizes the special duty to the public that a person or corporation has when the means
of public communication are within that entity’s control. The analysis of the cases described
in this article under the proposed Restatement provisions would necessarily begin with an
inquiry as to whether the Internet use in each case meets the definition of a place of public
communication. Only if that preliminary test were met would the provider be required to open
access to the public and face liability for discriminatory practices in that identified cyberplace.
{60} The AOL chat rooms in the Noah case clearly fall within the new definition, and Noah
would have a claim in tort for damages. The Intel e-mail system in the Hamidi case would also
fall within the definition because, although it is a local area network for employees, it is also
connected to the Internet and messages can travel freely into and out of the local e-mail system.
The critical issue in assessing Intel’s liability under this new framework would be determining
whether it had reasonable restrictions on public access and whether Hamidi violated those
restrictions.
{61} The implication of establishing the concept of a place of public communication is resonant
of the private property/public forum debate that emerged as privately-owned shopping centers
and malls began to replace publicly-owned streets and parks in downtown areas.185 In a series
of cases, the Supreme Court first recognized rights of speech in a company town,186 then in a
shopping center,187 whose recent development had replaced the downtown as a center of public
activity.188 The Supreme Court later overturned these rulings under federal law, but affirmed the
rights of states to protect public speech on private property for the public good.189 The debate
re-emerges as the Internet begins to replace other forums for speech. The proposed framework
utilizes state law, rather than federal law, to implement regulation, and is therefore consistent
with precedent. Internet sites are open to vast numbers of people; therefore, the emphasis in
Pruneyard that the regulations do not apply to small businesses or individuals190 is easily met
when applied to the online place of public communication.
{62} The requirement of reasonable terms of use recognizes that there should be a limit, for
public policy reasons of openness and preservation of mass speech forums, to the terms that
a private website owner may impose on the public. This right was referred to in EF Cultural
TravelBV v. Zefer Corporation,191 a case brought under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.192
While the court recognized that terms of use could prevent the use of automated robots, similar
to those used in eBay v. Bidder’s Edge,193 it also stated in dictum that terms of use that sought
to completely deny website access to competitors, to otherwise publicly available website
information, would raise serious policy concerns.194 The reasonableness standard included in
the framework recognizes the importance of the public policy of openness. It is also supported
by the Supreme Court’s statement that neither property nor contract rights are absolute, and
may be narrowly regulated by the state.195 It is particularly appropriate for the state to regulate
places of public communication, because much of the value of website property comes from the
interconnectedness of the network. While property, in general, is dependent on legal recognition
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to define its parameters, no other type of property is as dependent upon the existence of, and
connection with, other property as is web site property. While in the world of physical property
it is the right to the exclusive use of property, and the corollary right to exclude all others, which
gives value to the property, in the online world it is the ability of others to access, use, and
communicate with the computer which gives value to the network.
{63} The place of public communication model adopts some of the trespass to chattels rationale,
where interference with the network was the proven harm to the plaintiffs.196 However, it would
prevent further extension of the trespass doctrine as a means for service providers to suppress
certain forms of speech where the damage is the unwanted speech itself, not interference with
the operation of the website. That is, if the harm is trivial, it is similar to “pulling the ears of a
dog,”197 and may be non-compensable.
{64} On the other hand, the framework clearly protects rights of public speech when occurring in
a place of public communication. An AOL chat room would fall within the definition of a place of
public communication, and therefore, for example, if the allegations in Noah were proven to have
been true, liability would have resulted under this provision.
V. CONCLUSION
{65} The proposed framework for places of public communication balances online property
rights with online access and speech rights, and recognizes the unique quality of the Internet
by protecting both voice and property. It seeks to preserve the rights historically associated
with private property, while at the same time recognizing that when an online private property
owner transforms that property into a place for public communication, receiving a benefit from
that transformation, then the property owner can be subject to the common law duty of nondiscrimination traditionally imposed on innkeepers and common carriers.
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